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INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING:
THE UNITED STATES' COMPROMISE

INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION-United States enforcement
of international whaling programs-Neither the Pelly Amendment
nor the Packwood Amendment require the Secretary of Commerce
to certify to the President of the United States International Whaling
Commission quota violations by a foreign nation. Japan Whaling

Association v. American Cetacean Society, 106 S.Ct. 2860 (1986).
INTRODUCTION
Between 1931 and 1971, more than two million whales were harvested
worldwide.' The total mortality rate of the species, which included mortality from whaling, has been "in excess of the maximum rate allowable
for the steady maintenance of their numbers." 2 It is a fundamental tenet
in international law that all nations have a duty to conserve the living
resources of the sea, if only to ensure a renewable yield.' Whether for
economic, political, or conservationist purposes, many nations have become parties to agreements concerned with the nonexploitation of whales. 4
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)
produced one such agreement.
The ICRW developed a schedule to regulate harvesting practices and
set harvest limits for various whale species. 6 In addition, the ICRW
established the International Whaling Commission (IWC) to carry out
certain duties, such as amending the schedule and setting new harvest
quotas. 7 However, the IWC has no power to impose sanctions for quota
violations.'
i. THE WHALING ISSUE IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS 230 (J. Schmidhauser and G. Totten Ill ed.
1978).
2. Id. at 35.
3. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Geneva,
Switzerland, Apr. 29, 1958; 599 U.N.T.S. 285 [in force Mar. 20, 19661. Art. 1(2) states that "[AII
States have the duty to adopt, or to cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high
seas. 1"
4. P. BIRNIE, LEGAL MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION OF "PIRATE" WHALING 6 [international Union
for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Gland, Switzerland].
5. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S.
No. 1849 [hereinafter ICRW].
6. Id. at Art. 1, 62 Stat. 1717, 1723-27.
7. Id. at Art. III, 62 Stat. 1717-18; Id. at Art. V, 62 Stat. 1718-19.
8. Id. at Art. IX, 62 Stat. 1720.
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Because of the IWC's inability to enforce its own quota, Congress
passed two amendments, the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, 9 designed to improve compliance with international conservation
programs such as the IWC. Both amendments direct the Secretary of
Commerce to certify to the President if "nationals of a foreign country,
directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or
under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservation program....,," The Pelly Amendment gave the
President discretion to impose sanctions on an offending nation, while
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment requires the Executive Branch to
impose economic sanctions against offending nations." While both
amendments are designed to improve compliance with international conservation programs, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment reflects Congress' frustration with the President's power to refuse to impose sanctions
on offending nations.
This casenote will discuss the recent Supreme Court decision of Japan
Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 2 which effectively
strips the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments of their enforcement power. In this case, the American Cetacean Society argued that the
Secretary of Commerce had a mandatory duty to certify offending nations
to the President. They also argued that a finding that a nation was "diminishing the effectiveness" of the IWC was automatic once that nation
violated international quotas.' 3 The Court held that the Secretary has the
discretion to determine whether a foreign nation's violation of whaling
quotas diminishes the effectiveness of the IWC. 4 This note will focus
on legislative history regarding the Secretary's discretion to certify nations
which exceed whaling quotas and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
that history.
FACTS
In mid-October of 1984, several Japanese whalers departed from port.' 5
On November 11, 1984, the whaling vessels returned to Japan carrying
two sperm whales, despite an international moratorium which prohibited
9. Pelly Amendment of 1954, 22 U.S.C.§ 1978 (1982); Packwood-Magnuson Amendment of
1976, 16 U.S.C.§ 1821 (1982).
10. 22 U.S.C.§ 197 8(a)(1);
16 U.S.C.§ 1821.
II. 22 U.S.C.§ 1978(a)(3); 16 U.S.C.§ 1821(e)(2).
12. Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 474 U.S. 4929 (1986) [hereinafter
American Cetacean Society 111].
13. The term "diminish the effectiveness" is not defined in the statute. Because of this failure,
the heart of the controversy at hand centers around the interpretation of the term.
14. American Cetacean Society 11,106 S.Ct. at 2872.
15. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 12-13, American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge, 604 F.Supp.
1398 (D.D.C. 1985) [hereinafter American Cetacean Society 1)
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the harvesting of sperm whales.' 6 Japan was not bound by the moratorium
for several reasons. Although a member nation of the ICRW, Japan had
filed objections to the limitations set by the ICRW. By the terms of the
moratorium, Japan was therefore not bound to comply with the limits
established. "7Further, Japan, aware of potential sanctions from the United
States under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, had entered into an executive agreement with the United States. This agreement
allowed Japan to exceed limits set on whaling in exchange for Japan's
agreement to cease commercial whaling by 1988. "
Just prior to the consummation of the executive agreement, ten environmental groups "9led by Greenpeace U.S.A. filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.2' The groups sought a
writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the
President that Japan was in violation of an established sperm whale quota.
The groups wanted a determination that violating an established whaling
quota necessarily "diminished the effectiveness" of international programs designed to preserve whale species. Through the writ the groups
sought implicit verification that Japan was diminishing the effectiveness
of the IWC program. If Japan was diminishing the effectiveness of the
program, the American Cetacean Society argued that the Secretary had
a non-discretionary duty to certify Japan to the President. The President
then, in turn, had a non-discretionary duty to impose sanctions on Japan. 2
The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and
ordered certification by the Secretary.22 The court held that the Secretary
had a "clear, non-discretionary duty "23 to certify to the President that
Japanese nationals had violated the quota, in effect "diminishing the
effectiveness" of the IWC program. Additionally, the court held that any
16. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, adopted a zero quota for North
Pacific sperm whales in 1981 and voted in 1982 to implement a commercial whaling moratorium
beginning in 1986, see supra note 5. American Cetacean Society 1, 604 F.Supp. at 1403.
17. Japan was not bound under international law to comply with these quotas because it filed
timely objections to ICRW amendments pursuant to Article V, para. 3(c) of the ICRW. Id. Japan's
objection to the Schedule provisions was that the amendments were not based on scientific data and
therefore improperly approved.
18. The Secretary of Commerce concluded the executive agreement five days after this suit was
filed. American Cetacean Society 1, 604 F.Supp. at 1404. Note: In Nov. 1986, Japan agreed to cease
all commercial whaling by 1988.
19. The plaintiffs were the American Cetacean Society, Animal Protection Institute of America,
Animal Welfare Institute, Center for Environmental Education, The Fund for Animals, Greenpeace
U.S.A., The Humane Society of the United States, International Fund for Animal Welfare, The
Whale Center, and Thomas Garrett. On Dec. 13, 1984, the Connecticut Cetacean Society, Defenders
of Wildlife, and Friends of the Earth joined the plaintiffs in the district court action.

20. American Cetacean Society 1, 604 F.Supp. at 1398.
21. Id. at 1405.
22. id. at 1411.

23. Id.
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taking of whales in excess of established quotas diminished the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program. 24 The effect of
this decision was to require the Secretary to certify to the President any
nation which exceeded whaling quotas.
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. 25 Circuit Judge J. Skelley Wright
held that the Secretary had a non-discretionary duty to certify any member
nation which exceeded whaling quotas.26 The Circuit Court based its
decision on the extensive legislative history of the Pelly',and PackwoodMagnuson Amendments which provided for the enforcement of quotas
set by the international fishery conservation programs.27 The court found
Congress' intent unambiguous and clear. The court held that "where a
foreign nation allows its nationals to fish in excess of recommendations
set forth by an international fishery conservation
28 program, it has per se
diminished the effectiveness of that program."
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, granted
certiorari and reversed. Justice White, writing for the Court, held that
there was nothing in either the statutory amendments or the legislative
Japan for refusing to abide
history which required the Secretary to certify
29
by the whaling quotas set by the IWC.
BACKGROUND
The ICRW and IWC
On December 2, 1946, fifteen whaling nations, including the United
States, convened in Washington D.C. for the International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).' A major purpose behind the
ICRW was to establish a system of international regulation for whale
fisheries. The preamble to the ICRW states that it "[riecognizes specifically the interest of all the nations of the world in safeguarding for future
generations the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks." 3
One outcome of the Convention was a schedule regulating whale harvesting practices of member nations and setting harvest limits for various
whale species. 2
24. Id. The court also found that the amendments providing for the imposition of sanctions were

designed to "put teeth into the certification process by eliminating the discretion given ....

" Id.

25. American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge, 768 F2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106
S.Ct. 787 (1986) [hereinafter American Cetacean Society 11].

26. ld. at 444.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 435-37.
Id. at 444.
American CetaceanSociety III, 474 U.S. at 4934.
P. BIRNIE, supra note 4, at 6.
See supra note 5.
See supra note 30, at 12.
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Along with establishing a schedule for whale harvesting, the ICRW
also established the International Whaling Commission (IWC).33 The IWC
was authorized to amend the ICRW Schedule by setting harvest quotas
based on scientific data and the effects on the whaling industry.' However,

the IWC was not empowered to impose sanctions for quota violations.35
Further, the IWC contained a major loophole. Any member nation who
filed a timely objection to an IWC amendment exempted itself from any
obligation to comply with the limit set.36
In 1981, the IWC established a zero quota for the harvesting of sperm
whales. Japan filed timely objections to the quota, as well as to a 1982
commercial whaling moratorium. Under the terms of the ICRW "loophole" which exempted any member nation who filed a timely objection,
Japan was not bound to comply with either limitation.
The Pelly and Packwood Amendments
Because of the IWC's inability to enforce its own quotas, Congress
enacted the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act in 197 L"
The Pelly Amendment provided an enforcement power that the international regulations did not have. Under the Pelly Amendment, the United
States could impose economic sanctions against foreign states which

undermine fishery conservation programs."
The Amendment directs the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the
President if nationals of a foreign country are conducting fishing opera-

tions in such a way that would "diminish the effectiveness" of an inter33. ICRW, Art, I, para. I, 62 Stat. 1716-17.
34. Id. at Art. IV, para. I, 62 Stat. 1718. Art. IV, para. I provided that the IWC be composed
of one representative from each member nation. Article IV requires the Commission to
(a) encourage, recommend, or if necessary, organize studies relating to whales and
whaling;
(b) collect and analyze statistical information concerning current condition and trend
of the whale stocks and the effects of whaling activities thereon;
(c) study, appraise, and disseminate information concerning methods of maintaining
and increasing the populations of whale stocks.
35. Id. at Art. IX, 62 Stat. 1716, 1720.
36. Art. V of the ICRW states that "the amendment shall become effective with respect to all
Contracting Governments which have not presented objection but shall not become effective with
respect to any Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is withdrawn."
Id. at Art. V, para. 3(c), 62 Stat. 1716, 1719.
37. Pelly Amendment of 1954, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982). Named for Representative Pelly, the
Pelly Amendment applies to activities that "diminish the effectiveness" of an international fishery
conservation program, which is defined as "any ban, restriction, regulation, or other measure in
effect pursuant to a multilateral agreement which is in force with respect to the United States, the
purpose of which is to conserve or protect the living resources of the sea." 22 U.S.C. § 1978(h)(3).
38. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4). The pertinent language
states: "Upon receipt of any certification ... the President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury
to prohibit the bringing or the importation into the United States of fish products ... or wildlife
products ..
" (emphasis added). ld.
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national fishery program. 9 Once a country is certified, the President has
the discretion whether to direct the imposition of sanctions against the
offending nation.' These sanctions include prohibiting offending nations
from importing fish products."'
Because the President's duty to impose sanctions on a certified nation
was discretionary, Congress acted to strengthen the IWC's ability to
enforce its quotas. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act" required expedition
of the certification process and mandated the imposition of economic
sanctions by the Executive Branch on a certified nation. 4 However, the
scope of the Secretary's duty concerning the requirements for certifying
a nation to the President for sanctions remained unclear. Of central importance to the present case is whether, under these amendments, the
Secretary of Commerce has a duty to certify a nation which exceeds
quotas imposed by the IWC or whether this power is merely discretionary.
ANALYSIS
Under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, certification
is required when the Secretary determines that a foreign nation is conducting fishing operations which diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW.'
Yet neither amendment clearly defines when a foreign country is conducting fishing operations in such a manner as to "diminish the effectiveness" of the ICRW or the IWC."' The Supreme Court's recent decision
in American CetaceanSociety III does not help to clarify the issue. Rather,
it avoids a potentially political situation with Congress and the Executive
Branch by interpreting the amendments as granting broad discretionary
power in the Secretary of Commerce.
39. Id. at § 1821 (a)(2). The pertinent language states: "When the Secretary of Commerce or the
Secretary of the Interior finds that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are engaging
in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any international program for endangered
or threatened species, the Secretary making such finding shall certify such fact to the President."
(emphasis added), Id.
40. See supra note 38.
41. d.
42. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982).
43. Id. (named for Senator Packwood]. See 125 CoNr. ReC. 22,081 (1979). Rep. Murphy
commented that the certification process was "taking entirely too much time" and that "it is the
intent of [the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment] to make it clear that the Congress expects [the
Secretaries of Commerce and Interior] to act swiftly and promptly in making such investigations
...in the future."
44. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1); 16 U.S.C. § 182t.
45. Section (e)(2)(A) of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment states that "the term 'certification'
means a certification made by the Secretary that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly,
are conducting fishing operations or engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness
of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling." Section (a)(1) of the Pelly Amendment is virtually identical.
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The visible question in American Cetacean Society III is whether the
Secretary of Commerce has a nondiscretionary duty to certify to the
President nations which violate established whaling quotas. The underlying issue is whether the violation of whaling quotas necessarily "diminishes the effectiveness" of international fishery conservation programs,
or whether the Secretary has the discretion to determine what conduct
diminishes the effectiveness.
Legislative History
In its analysis, the Court focused exclusivelyon statutory interpretation,
rather than treading onto the less traditional ground of policymaking.
Thus, the Court relied heavily on the legislative history of the Pelly and
Packwood Amendments. Because Congress did not clearly define the
term "diminish the effectiveness," the term was left open to judicial
interpretation. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Pelly and Packwood Amendments does not clearly indicate whether a violation of an
IWC regulation requires certification by the Secretary to the President.
To determine congressional intent, the Supreme Court utilized the principles of statutory construction.' For example, the motive underlying
enactment of a statute should be carefully considered in determining the
true congressional intent of the statute.47 The Supreme Court in this case
recognized this principle when it stated that "[i]f Congress has directly
spoken to the precise issue in question, if the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter."" Thus, sponsoring legislation, while not
conclusive, should be accorded great weight in determining legislative
intent.4 9
The Court relied on select legislative history to support its holding.
Representative Pelly, sponsor of the Pelly Amendment, stated that a
primary purpose of his bill was to enforce compliance with international
fishery conservation measures which lacked any real enforcement power
of their own.-' The Supreme Court did not rely on this statement. Rather,
it focused on Senate Hearing statements by Representative Pelly that the
Pelly Amendment sanctions were to be applied only "in the case of
flagrant violation of any international fishery conservation program to
which the United States has committed itself." ' The Supreme Court
determined 'that because it was unclear what constitutes a "flagrant"
46. The construction of a statute is a question for the court. However, courts are bound by certain
principles of statutory construction. See Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp.,
305 U.S. 315 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 675 (1939).
47. See U.S. v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66 (1952), reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 910 (1952).
48. American Cetacean Society I1l, 106 S.Ct. at 2867.
49. See U.S. v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66 (1952).
50. 117 CONG. REc. 34,752 (1971) (Statement of Rep. Pelly).
5. 1Id.
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violation, Congress intended to give the Secretary discretion in determining what violated the standard. 2
The dissent argues that Senator Packwood clearly understood the ramifications of his Amendment.53 In a letter to the Secretary of Commerce,
Senator Packwood stated, "I see no way around the logical conclusion
that a nation which ignores the moratorium is diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC. "' The Secretary agreed in a subsequent letter that "any
such whaling ...would clearly diminish the effectiveness of the IWC.5""
The Secretary of Commerce made other comments which support the
position of the American Cetacean Society that any violation of an IWC
regulation required certification and sanctions. In a letter concerning the
complete moratorium on commercial whaling to go into effect in 1985,
the Secretary stated that "[any government that chooses to ignore the
commercial whaling moratorium implemented by the IWC and thereby
diminishes the effectiveness of the IWC should be prepared to accept the
consequences of this noncompliance."' While the district court chose to
rely heavily on this statement,57 the Supreme Court ignored it.
Additional support for the dissent's position that the Secretary had a
non-discretionary duty is found in a Senate report which expressly laid
out the purpose of the Pelly Amendment.5" The statement suppbrted a
nondiscretionary duty in the Secretary to certify nations which exceeded
whaling quotas. 9 The majority glossed over the statement by asserting
that it contained "not the words of a ministerial duty, but the imposition
of a duty to make an informed judgment.'
In isolation, the Court's interpretation of this statement may be plausible. However, in the context of other legislative history, the existence
of a nondiscretionary duty in the Secretary is evident. For example,
exchanges between members of Congress and Richard A. Frank, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
demonstrate that Congress believed that when a nation violated IWC
52. American Cetacean Society 111,
106 S.Ct. at 2869.
53. Id. at 2873-74. (Marshall, J., dissenting.) Brennan, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined in the
dissent.
54. Letter from Senator Packwood to Secretary Baldridge, June 28, 1984.
55. Letter from Secretary Baldridge to Senator Packwood, July 24, 1984.
56. Hearingson § 1242 et al. Before the Subcommittee on Oceans andAtmosphere of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1971) (emphasis added).
57. American CetaceanSociety 1, 604 FSupp. at 1408.
58. S. REP. No. 582, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1971).
59. S. REP. No. 582 stated that the purpose of the Pelly Amendment was "to prohibit the
importation of fishery products from nations that do not conduct their fishing operations in a manner
that is consistent with international conservation programs. It would accomplish this by providing
that whenever the Secretary of Commerce determines that a country's nationals are fishing in such
a manner, he must certify such fact to the President." Id.
60. American CetaceanSociety ii, 106 S.Ct. at 2869.
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quotas, the only discretion the President had was in his choice of sanction. 6' Representative Breaux summarized Mr. Frank's remarks to Congress by stating that "Dick Frank is saying that the taking of whales in
violation of IWC quotas is something that automatically would require
the Department of Commerce to certify that nation as being in violation
of the taking provision."6
Based on overwhelming legislative history of this sort, it seems clear
that Congress understood that the Secretary had a nondiscretionary duty
to certify a nation which violated IWC quotas. However, the Court may
have disregarded much of the legislative history for political reasons.
The PoliticalArena
Although conflicting and ambiguous legislative history allowed the
Court an "out" in this case, it is clear that the Court's position avoided
a political battlefield.63 If the Court had affirmed the court of appeals by
ruling that the Secretary of Commerce had a nondiscretionary duty to
certify any member nation which violated a whaling limitation, the Court
would have derogated the Executive Agreement between the United States
and Japan. The effect of this derogation may have been to threaten an
otherwise harmonious working relationship between the United States
and Japan. Further, an affirmance by the Court could have made other
countries less willing to enter into executive agreements with the United
States for fear that the agreements could become empty-handed promises
at the whim of Congress.
The Court was aware of its potential intrusion into the political arena.
Justice White stated that "[w]e are cognizant of the interplay between
these Amendments and the conduct of this Nation's foreign relations, and
we recognize the premier role which both Congress and the Executive
play in this field."" By focusing its analysis exclusively on legislative
history, the Court was able to avoid intrusion.6 5 However, the Court's
analysis focused too narrowly on select legislative history, and thus derogated the effectiveness of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments.
61. Hearings on Whaling Policy and International Whaling Commission Oversight Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 301, 322-23 (1979).
62. Id. at 359 (remarks of Rep. Breaux).
63. It is interesting to note, however, that the Court concluded that the present case presented a
justiciable controversy. The Court stated: "Under the Constitution, one of the judiciary's characteristic
roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision
may have significant political overtones." American Cetacean Society iii, 106 S.Ct. at 2866.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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CONCLUSION
This Court's decision itself effectively diminishes international fishery
conservation programs by putting broad discretion in the Secretary of
Commerce to determine when a violation has occurred. In its interpretation of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, the Court
relied upon select legislative history. The Court disregarded a large part
of the legislative history which would have supported a finding that the
Secretary had a nondiscretionary duty to certify any nation which exceeded whaling limits set by the IWC.
However, Congress is equally to blame for this problem as it left both
the Packwood and Pelly Amendments open to interpretation. Congress
easily could have stated that the Secretary must certify every violation
of IWC quotas.' While legislative history can be a valuable and useful
tool in interpreting statutory provisions, in this instance it proved to be
confusing and, at times, contradictory, though a majority belief was
certainly discernable. Congress now must act again if it wishes to make
clear its meaning behind the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments.
The Court seems to have been forced into its position because of its
fear of encroaching on the Executive Branch. While this is certainly a
legitimate fear, given our system of "separate but equal" branches of
government, the Court, in a conservative political climate, used this
excuse to sidestep the fundamental issue in American Cetacean Society
Ill-the protection of our diminishing environmental resources.
SUSAN GEHA

66. The Court itself stated that "[hiad Congress intended otherwise, it would have been a simple
matter to say that the Secretary must certify deliberate taking of whales in excess of IWC limits."
Id. at 2867.

